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INTRODUCTION 
On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia was found dead in 
his room at a ranch in West Texas, where he was on a hunting vacation, 
with a pillow over his head.1 It is possible that people die with pillows 
over their heads, but this was the most famous member of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, who was in good enough health to go on a hunting 
vacation and had shown few signs of illness to his hunting companions. 
That said, Justice Scalia was in his late seventies and had the kinds of 
preexisting medical conditions that made it probable that he had died 
of natural causes. Nevertheless, there was enough in the story to get 
conspiracy theorists riled up, and even our current President (then, 
candidate) said in response to an interviewer asking him about the 
possibility of something suspicious: “It’s a horrible topic, but they say 
 
 * Faculty at the law schools of NYU and Duke, respectively. For comments on multiple 
stages of this project, we are grateful to Joe Boatwright, Cindy Gardner, Tracey George, and Un 
Kyung Park. Katherine Boyles provided exceptional research assistance on a topic where the 
research material was hard to come by. 
 1. See Nora Kelly, Why Wasn’t Antonin Scalia Given an Autopsy?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/antonin-scalia-autopsy/463251/ 
[https://perma.cc/YZ52-FN2L] (highlighting the initial uncertainty regarding the placement of a 
pillow near Scalia’s head); Judy Melinek, Justice Scalia’s Unexamined Death Points to a Problem, 
CNN (Feb. 20, 2016, 9:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/18/opinions/justice-scalia-no-autopsy-
melinek/index.html [https://perma.cc/V32H-V5C8] (examining issues with the current system of 
death investigation). 
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they found a pillow on his face, which is a pretty unusual place to find 
a pillow.”2 
Yet, the death examiner, Cinderela Guevara—not a trained 
pathologist, but a local county judge—decided to forego the autopsy 
without visiting the scene because the county sheriff assured her that 
there was “no foul play,” Justice Scalia’s personal physician told the 
judge that the death was due to “natural causes,” and the Scalia family 
requested that no autopsy take place.3 Had, by contrast, Justice Scalia 
died in a hotel in Boston, Singapore, or Tokyo, there would have been a 
detailed investigation and an autopsy by a qualified pathologist.4 That 
is, the kind of examination that those of us who watch crime shows on 
television assume happens in every case. 
Putting aside the credibility of Alex Jones and other conspiracy 
theorists about whether President Obama or aliens were eliminating 
conservative Supreme Court Justices prior to the 2016 presidential 
election,5 there exists a real question here, which is whether there needs 
to be a uniform system of professional death examinations across the 
United States. Currently, there are counties and states where decisions 
about autopsies and the issuance of death certificates are made by a 
local coroner who often needs nothing more than a high school diploma 
to run for election to the job of coroner.6 In the nineteenth century, the 
coroner system predominated in the United States. Many but not all 
states shifted toward professional medical examiners in the twentieth 
 
 2. See Gideon Resnick, Meet the Scalia Death Truthers: Was He Murdered by Obama or 
Aliens?, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/meet-the-scalia-
death-truthers-was-he-murdered-by-obama-or-aliens [https://perma.cc/Y9AS-2QAT] (reporting on 
an interview with President Donald Trump by Michael Savage and on Alex Jones’s conspiracy 
theories on the matter). 
 3. See Mark Berman, Texas Judge Defends Decision Not to Order Autopsy for Justice Scalia, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2016/02/16/texas-judge-defends-decision-not-to-order-autopsy-for-justice-
scalia/?utm_term=.91b61b0fb9a8 [https://perma.cc/M3VF-BSY9] (discussing criticism and 
conspiracy resulting from the decision not to perform an autopsy). 
 4. See Melinek, supra note 1 (discussing the independent death investigations conducted by 
medical examiner officers in urban areas).  
 5. See Brian Tashman, Alex Jones: Obama Murdered Justice Scalia and Donald Trump Is 
Next, RIGHT WING WATCH (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:15 PM), http://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/alex-
jones-obama-murdered-justice-scalia-and-donald-trump-is-next/ [https://perma.cc/VD5D-MED6] 
(detailing conspiracy theory). 
 6. See Carl Parrott, Advantages and Disadvantages of the Coroner System, in 2003 
MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYS.: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 25, 25, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221919/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK221919.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/43XP-ALSA] [hereinafter MEDICOLEGAL WORKSHOP SUMMARY] (“Coroners are 
elected lay people who often do not have professional training, whereas medical examiners are 
appointed and have board-certification in a medical specialty.”). See generally JEFFREY M. 
JENTZEN, DEATH INVESTIGATION IN AMERICA: CORONERS, MEDICAL EXAMINERS, AND THE PURSUIT 
OF MEDICAL CERTAINTY (2009) (comparing systems of death investigation in the United States). 
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century. Members of the medical profession who work in this area have 
long expressed concern about the persistence of coroners today in 
certain states.7 For them, the answer is obvious: the system should be 
run by highly trained, board-certified pathologists.8 Our instinct is that 
the doctors are probably right. Given that there is significant variation 
across the states in terms of whether death examination offices are run 
by trained professionals or local politicians, we should, in theory, be 
able to empirically test the question of whether professionals or 
politicians do a better job of adjudicating death. It turns out that, 
although there are strong opinions about what the answer surely is, 
there has been little in the way of serious empirical work addressing 
this question. Our Article takes a first cut at looking at how one might 
do that analysis. 
The question of whether professionals or politicians are best 
suited for a given task is not unique to death examiners. There has, for 
example, long been a robust debate on the question of whether 
appointed judges (professionals) are better than elected judges 
(politicians). Politicians are likely to be more responsive to the 
immediate needs of the voting public; after all, they want to be 
reelected. But that also means that they are likely to be less 
independent.9 If they believe that being hard on criminals is a good vote-
getting strategy, they are likely to do that. Indeed, research suggests 
 
 7. E.g., Melinek, supra note 1; see also Randy Hanzlick, The Conversion of Coroner Systems 
to Medical Examiner Systems in the United States: A Lull in the Action, 28 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. 
& PATHOLOGY 279, 279 (2007) (explaining the importance of qualified medical examiners); Randy 
Hanzlick & Debra Combs, Medical Examiner and Coroner Systems: History and Trends, 279 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 870, 874 (1998) (describing reduced support for replacing coroners with medical 
examiners as worrisome).  
 8. For example, Randy Hanzlick has argued that “[d]eath investigations may involve 
complex medical issues which require physician interpretation and judgment. Therefore, it is 
important that these death investigation systems—whether coroner or medical examiner—include 
appropriately educated and trained physicians with special expertise in the subject matter.” 
Hanzlick, supra note 7, at 279. Similarly, in 2015, the National Commission on Forensic Science 
requested that “the Attorney General of the United States approve a policy that recommends that 
all offices, facilities, or institutions performing medicolegal death investigation activities be 
accredited by the year 2020,” and stated that “[o]f the estimated 2,366 medicolegal death 
investigation offices in the United States, less than 100 are accredited by either the National 
Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) or the International Association of Coroners and 
Medical Examiners (IAC&ME).” NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ACCREDITATION OF MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION OFFICES 1 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/01/21/mdiaccreditationfin
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV5E-KDVH]. 
 9. E.g., Lee Epstein, Electoral Benefits: The Assault on the Assaulters of Judicial Elections, 
96 JUDICATURE 218, 219–21 (2013); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 43, 51 (2003); cf. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or 
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 290 (2010) (testing the conventional wisdom that appointed judges are more 
independent than, and therefore superior to, elected judges). 
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that they are going to do that more when elections approach.10 On the 
flip side, the professionals—the ones who have job security and cannot 
be removed except for extreme misbehavior—have little incentive to 
consider the preferences and needs of those who they are supposed to 
be serving. They are going to be more independent, which does not 
always result in what is good for society; they may use that 
independence to shirk their job obligations. These tensions between 
independence and responsiveness are familiar, and much debated, in 
the judicial context. Less attention has been paid to whether it is better 
to have professionals or politicians populate other key roles in the legal 
system, such as prosecutors, defense lawyers, and sheriffs, in addition 
to death examiners. We hope to add insight into this question through 
an examination of death examiners.  
Many of us are familiar with death examiners only through 
television, from shows like CSI, Bones, and Body of Proof. There, the 
characters tend to be super doctors with unlimited resources to do 
whatever tests they want. Reality is different. The systems for death 
examination vary considerably across the fifty states. As noted earlier, 
in some states, a high school diploma suffices as the qualification to run 
for election to be a coroner (the politicians).11 In North Carolina, until 
1967, all that coroner candidates needed to do to be qualified was “to 
declare they had not denied the being of Almighty God or participated 
in a duel.”12 In other states, doctors are in charge of the investigations, 
but even here there appear to be issues; some doctors are not 
pathologists, while others are pathologists who never passed their 
board exams. 
Death examiners do the first evaluation of a dead body and 
determine whether further investigation into the cause of death is 
warranted. This decision regarding whether to do additional 
investigation (an autopsy) and the quality of the subsequent 
investigation that is done if an autopsy is ordered can be important. The 
paradigm case is the circumstance where an otherwise healthy person 
dies suddenly in a prison lockup. The death examiner will be the one 
who typically has to make the decision regarding whether the 
 
 10. Epstein, supra note 9, at 220. 
 11. See, e.g., Randy Hanzlick, Overview of the Medicolegal Death Investigation System in the 
United States, in MEDICOLEGAL WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 7, 9–10. For an example of 
the requirements necessary to become a coroner, see Role of the Medical Examiner, FORENSIC SCI., 
http://lorpub.gadoe.org/State%20of%20Georgia/GAVS%20Shared/Science/ForensicScience_Autop
syRoleMedicalExaminer_SHARED/ForensicScience_AutopsyRoleMedicalExaminer_SHARED5.h
tml (last updated Sept. 1, 2015) [https://perma.cc/7S9R-43MS] (cataloging coroner eligibility 
requirements mandated by law in the state of Georgia). 
 12. BERNARD HIRSCHHORN, DEMOCRACY REFORMED: RICHARD SPENCER CHILDS AND HIS 
FIGHT FOR BETTER GOVERNMENT 156 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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circumstances were suspicious enough to warrant an autopsy and, 
further, what level of resources should be expended in doing the autopsy 
(additional tests, etc.). If done promptly and properly, an autopsy might, 
for example, show that the prisoner was beaten recently, leading to 
liability for the state and a political scandal. If not investigated quickly, 
the evidence might deteriorate and, indeed, be completely destroyed by 
a cremation. The question then is whether having a politician who faces 
regular elections, as compared to a professional with job security, in 
charge of the death examination process is more or less likely to result 
in a proper investigation of what happened. In cases where the death 
examination officer is a politician with close ties to the local police, there 
might be an incentive to avoid doing too much investigation.13 In 
contrast, one might also imagine that officials who face regular 
elections would be under constant pressure to perform well—
particularly if the local press was monitoring and reporting on 
suspicious events—and less susceptible to outside influence such as 
bribes or the desire to curry favor with the local police. The point is that, 
assuming we think that a process should be put in place such that 
suspicious deaths are investigated—and particularly so when they 
involve potential abuses by state actors—it is not clear whether elected 
politicians or appointed medical professionals would do better. 
Autopsies can also yield useful information in other contexts, 
especially in terms of revealing undiagnosed illnesses and nonobvious 
errors in medical treatments.14 There are significant public health 
benefits to knowing why people are dying; autopsies can reveal 
spreading diseases that public health officials might not have otherwise 
caught.15 Autopsies, however, require the expenditure of resources. 
Even basic autopsies cost over $1,000.16 And that number increases 
further if the doctors hired to do the investigations are themselves 
 
 13. See, e.g., A.C. Thompson et al., In New Orleans, Uncovering Errors and Oversights, NPR 
(Feb. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/01/133301618/in-new-orleans-uncovering-
errors-and-oversights [https://perma.cc/E7TJ-KXQS] (discussing alleged systemic problems in 
autopsies in New Orleans); see also Adriane Quinlan, After 40 Years in Office, New Orleans Coroner 
Frank Minyard is Moving On, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 2, 2014, 12:47 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/health/index.ssf/2014/05/after_40_years_in_office_new_o.html 
[https://perma.cc/8CCP-HTN8] (spotlighting the elected coroner at the center of the controversy in 
New Orleans’ autopsies). 
 14. Marshall Allen, Without Autopsies, Hospitals Bury Their Mistakes, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 15, 
2011, 12:36 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/without-autopsies-hospitals-bury-their-
mistakes [https://perma.cc/YGR8-W2LT] (contending that fewer autopsies in recent years have 
allowed medical diagnostic errors to go undiscovered).  
 15. See Randy Hanzlick, Medical Examiners, Coroners, and Public Health: A Review and 
Update, 130 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 1274, 1276–78 (2006) (cataloging the 
public health benefits of autopsies). 
 16. Allen, supra note 14. 
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expensive and tend to demand expensive tests. A professional, as 
contrasted with a politician, might not be terribly concerned about 
spending taxpayer funds on autopsies which, to the extent they unearth 
a scandal involving state abuse, might result in taxpayers having to pay 
out even more to compensate for the abuse. Will death examiners who 
are elected to their positions—and thus are more responsive to taxpayer 
concerns—be more sensitive to costs and therefore be in the best 
position to make this tradeoff? 
Our initial goal with this project was to test the difference in 
performance between offices run by appointed medical professionals or 
elected coroners (who may not even have a basic medical degree, let 
alone be board certified in pathology). As noted, the strong sentiment 
in the literature is that medical professionals do a better job than local 
politicians.17 This seemed plausible to us, but there is almost no 
empirical evidence that supports that claim.18 And there are enough 
scandals involving the medical professionals who do death 
examinations to at least raise the question that they are not always 
doing the best job.19  
Our starting hypothesis is that, all else equal, offices run by 
professional medical examiners would make fewer errors and be less 
likely to be beholden to local political interests than coroners. In the 
alternative, the desire for professional qualifications may be overdone 
and, worse, driven by some combination of elitism and self-interest of 
the medical profession that has a strong influence at institutions, such 
as the National Academy of Sciences, that have been pushing for the 
 
 17. E.g., JENTZEN, supra note 6; Hanzlick, supra note 7. 
 18. See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text (discussing the NPR and ProPublica 
studies). 
 19. E.g., Radley Balko, The Fifth Circuit Turns Its Back on a Huge Forensics Scandal in 
Mississippi, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2014/02/28/the-fifth-circuit-turns-its-back-on-a-huge-forensics-scandal-in-
mississippi/?utm_term=.38ac0167c996 [https://perma.cc/DQU4-CF2E] (discussing controversy in 
Mississippi over a medical examiner’s practices); Walt Bogdanich, A Mother’s Death, a Botched 
Inquiry and a Sheriff at War, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/us/michelle-oconnell-jeremy-banks.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/56CY-Y7FP] (detailing a death investigation scandal in Florida); Conor 
Friedersdorf, CSI Is a Lie, ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/csi-is-a-lie/390897/ [https://perma.cc/KW98-
GCA7] (highlighting concerns about forensic and state crime lab systems generally); Jenifer 
McKim, Child Deaths Go Unsolved as Autopsies Fall Behind, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 29, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/11/28/many-investigations-into-massachusetts-child-
abuse-deaths-remain-limbo-for-years/e4qO9xOmlthllM8PV2rXBN/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6GUL-YWJU] (investigating backlog of autopsies in Massachusetts); This Time, 
Fix N.C. Medical Examiner System, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 7, 2015, 4:40 PM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/editorials/article17747501.html 
[https://perma.cc/B54A-6ZE6] (discussing the flaws of the death investigation system in North 
Carolina).  
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professionalization of the death examiner position.20 Maybe it is not 
that difficult to determine whether the circumstances of death are 
suspicious and warrant further investigation by a medical professional.  
In what follows, we report on our findings. We should state at 
the outset though that our findings are limited by the sparseness of the 
available data. To the extent that we have persuaded readers that the 
underlying question of whether coroners or professional medical 
examiners perform better is an important one, our bottom line is that 
there is a desperate need for good data. 
We focus initially on two measures of performance relevant for 
autopsies. First, we look at the number of death examiner offices in a 
state that are accredited by the National Association of Medical 
Examiners (“NAME”).21 We conjecture that accreditation by the NAME 
is a proxy for the (high) quality of the death examinations that take 
place in the state. The greater the number of accredited death examiner 
offices in the state (which can include either a coroner or a professional 
medical examiner), the greater is the overall quality of death 
examinations in the state. Second, we look at the number of litigation 
events related to misconduct in an autopsy under state law. If the death 
examiner does a poor job, we expect that the chance of litigation arising 
from the low-quality autopsy or decision not to do an autopsy will be 
high. 
We next look to the question of why any rational state would 
have anything but board-certified pathologists doing death 
investigations. A century ago, almost all states relied on nonmedical 
professionals—coroners—to conduct medical examinations of the 
deceased. Historically, coroners often served a nonmedical function, 
locating and determining the legal ownership of any found treasure 
trove. Commencing about a century ago, states began to shift toward 
 
 20. In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences called for a move away from allowing lay 
coroners to sign death certificates. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. 
CMTY., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 241–68 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QWR5-6RFL] (calling for the elimination of the coroner system). 
 21. The National Association of Medical Examiners  
is the national professional organization of physician medical examiners, medicolegal 
death investigators and death investigation system administrators who perform the 
official duties of the medicolegal investigation of deaths of public interest in the United 
States. NAME was founded in 1966 with the dual purposes of fostering the professional 
growth of physician death investigators and disseminating the professional and 
technical information vital to the continuing improvement of the medical investigation 
of violent, suspicious and unusual deaths. 
 About NAME, NAT’L ASS’N MED. EXAMINERS, 
https://netforum.avectra.com/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=NAME&WebCode=AboutNAME 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SD6N-Q2MY]. 
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professional medical examiners. While the majority of states today 
either exclusively or partially rely on medical examiners, a number of 
states continue to rely solely on the coroner system.22 What explains the 
persistence of coroners in these states? 
There are a number of potential answers. First, it may simply be 
local corruption. Politicians may use lower visibility positions to reward 
supporters or friends or family of a supporter. The little-followed 
coroner position may be an example of the type of position that is given 
as a reward. Politicians may either appoint a supporter to the coroner 
position or nominate the supporter as the party candidate in an elected 
coroner position. We predict that states in which there is greater 
corruption and a greater history of political patronage affecting the 
staffing of governmental positions will be more likely to have retained 
the coroner position and resisted the trend toward professional medical 
examiners.  
Second, some states have a long tradition of not deferring to 
expertise but instead relying on more direct democracy to fill important 
governmental positions. Even if some degree of expertise is sacrificed, 
such states gain to the extent elected officials are more responsive to 
the preferences of citizens and reflect a preference in such states for 
direct democracy. We predict that those states that demonstrate a 
preference for direct democracy, in particular, those states with an 
elected judiciary (whether partisan or nonpartisan elections), will be 
more likely to also stay with the coroner system. 
In what follows, we briefly describe the scarce literature that 
compares coroner and medical examiner systems and then move to 
some basic empirical tests using the available data. While the 
underlying questions about system design are important and 
interesting, the available data is so poor that it is difficult to come to 
informed conclusions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The legal literature on death examinations is thin. One student 
note, from over a decade ago, noted the enormous variation across death 
examination systems in the United States, focusing in particular on the 
 
 22. Graphics: How Is Death Investigated in Your State?, NPR (Feb. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/02/03/131242432/graphics-how-is-death-investigated-in-your-state 
[https://perma.cc/8AJF-S4SG] (displaying graphically the death investigation systems in each 
state). 
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differences in required qualifications across the systems.23 There are a 
handful of other articles discussing the value of resuscitating the 
common law procedure of death inquests (grand jury–like procedures to 
investigate deaths in certain circumstances), still used in places like 
Vermont and Missouri. The legal literature on death examinations ends 
there.24 
There has been slightly more interest in death investigations in 
medical-academic communities and in the popular media. Most 
relevant are a series of broadcasts, articles, and reports that NPR 
produced between 2011 and 2013, entitled Post-Mortem: Death 
Investigation in America.25 In partnership with ProPublica, NPR 
conducted a quantitative study of coroner/medical examiner offices 
across the United States.26 The study attempted to break down death 
investigations by the kind of professional performing each investigation 
and also sought to identify how many autopsies were performed versus 
how many autopsies might be expected.27 One can quibble over whether 
the number of autopsies performed is a good measure of the quality of 
a death examination system—after all, the quality of the autopsies is a 
crucial variable here. That said, the gap between expected autopsies 
and actual autopsies, if it could be constructed credibly, would give us 
a good sense of the variation across systems in terms of whether 
investigations were even occurring. Unfortunately, extending NPR’s 
research effort is not easy—autopsy data is not readily available and 
has to be collected by contacting individual death examiner offices. Of 
particular relevance to us, NPR’s data was collected on very few of the 
coroner-only states, which means that the most important comparison 
of how coroner-only states were performing against medical examiner 
states could not be done in a meaningful fashion. The bottom line of the 
 
 23. Andrea R. Tischler, Note, Speaking for the Dead: A Call for Nationwide Coroner Reform, 
33 SW. U. L. REV. 553, 558 (2004) (highlighting the divergence in eligibility requirements between 
states).  
 24. Paul MacMahon, The Inquest and the Virtues of Soft Adjudication, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 275, 281 (2015) (discussing death inquests generally); H. Morley Swingle, Coroner’s Inquests 
in Missouri: Modern Usage of the Hue and Cry, 63 J. MO. B. 80, 83 (2007) (discussing death 
investigations in Missouri); Paul S. Gillies, When Inquests Were Inquisitions, VT. B.J., Fall 2015, 
at 10, 10–15 (discussing death investigations in Vermont). 
 25. Post Mortem: Death Investigation in America, NPR, http://www.npr.org/series/ 
133208980/post-mortem-death-investigation-in-america (last updated Jan. 4, 2013) 
[https://perma.cc/RVW4-XCMM].  
 26. Autopsy Data, NPR (Feb. 1, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/02/ 
133381758/autopsy-data [https://perma.cc/H2Q9-A84Y]. 
 27. Id. The expected autopsy rate was computed based on the CDC mortality data on the 
relationship between autopsy rate and the homicide and unintentional-death rate in an area. Id.; 
see also Krista Kjellman Schmidt, About Our Autopsy Data, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/about-our-autopsy-data [https://perma.cc/42RC-UFNA] 
(explaining calculations in greater detail).  
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NPR study was that the system as a whole was woeful, with no clear 
coroner versus medical examiner result.28  
ProPublica also published a series of articles illustrating the 
problems with death investigations.29 These articles highlight cases 
where the death investigation system has failed and point to the lack of 
uniform training and standards, as well as a national shortage of 
qualified pathologists to properly investigate each death that merits 
such an investigation.30 There are also examples in popular news media 
of botched autopsies or entire coroner/medical examiner offices run 
astray.31 These articles tend to highlight particularized and especially 
egregious examples of poor coroner/medical examiner performance 
without examining pervasive, systemic failures of the current death 
investigation system.32 There are still other popular news stories 
covering more general failures of state crime labs.33 Overall though, 
there is little in the way of systematic data collection or analysis about 
the death examination system. 
II. DATA 
To examine the coroner versus medical examiner question, we 
had to first construct measures of quality that could be used to compare 
the two systems at the state level. A more fine-tuned analysis would 
examine matters at the county level, but for this exploratory 
examination, we limited our analysis to the state level. Not being 
experts, we spoke to a number of medical examiners and coroners (some 
 
 28. See Map: Death in America, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/post-
mortem/map-death-in-america/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/C7BJ-G9ZK] 
(detailing geographically the varying systems of death investigations in each state). 
 29. E.g., A.C. Thompson et al., Real CSI: Patchy U.S. Death Investigations Put the Living at 
Risk, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/patchy-us-death-
investigations/ [https://perma.cc/3RUT-FCU6] (highlighting shortcomings in the current coroner 
system).  
 30. See id.  
 31. See, e.g., Jessica Pishko, Angela Corey’s Forgetful Medical Examiner, NATION (Aug. 30, 
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/angela-coreys-forgetful-medical-examiner/ 
[https://perma.cc/PA6Z-GMMW] (documenting allegations that the dementia and problematic 
practices of a former medical examiner were intentionally overlooked by a former Florida state 
attorney).  
 32. See, e.g., Jeff Marcu, Chief Medical Examiner Says She Found Malpractice When She 
Took over Office, FIRSTCOASTNEWS.COM (Apr. 13, 2012, 8:08 PM), 
http://downtownjax.firstcoastnews.com/news/news/77084-chief-medical-examiner-says-she-found-
malpractice-when-she-took-over-office [https://perma.cc/6NYJ-85RK] (recounting systemic issues 
within county medical examiner’s office). 
 33. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Crime Lab Scandals Just Keep Getting Worse, SLATE (Oct. 29, 
2015, 5:21 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/10/massachusetts 
_crime_lab_scandal_worsens_dookhan_and_farak.html [https://perma.cc/5NXY-JQBN] 
(highlighting egregious misconduct by chemist in state drug lab). 
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of the latter were also lawyers and judges) about what kinds of 
measures they would find to be credible indicators. Considering the 
caveat that they all warned us that data would be difficult to obtain, we 
posit that the following could act as proxies for death examination 
quality. 
 
 Qualifications: Employees with better qualifications 
presumably do a better job. In theory, this measure could 
look at whether the pathologists doing the autopsies are 
board certified. Alternatively, this measure could focus 
on the fraction of the pathologists in that state who are 
board certified or whether the local offices are accredited 
by a credible national or international agency. 
 Litigation: Better run offices presumably have fewer 
lawsuits brought against them relating to autopsies—
either regarding the quality of a performed autopsy or the 
decision whether to perform an autopsy. One indicator of 
quality might be the number of lawsuits brought against 
death examiners in a state alleging errors in the death 
examination process (adjusted for the size of the 
population in the state) for a particular time period. 
 Scandals: Even good offices make errors. But large and 
systemic problems—the kinds of events that make for 
news stories—are likely a sign of dysfunction. A possible 
indicator of office quality, therefore, is the number of 
major news stories in a particular time period regarding 
systemic problems in a local death examiner office.34 
 Scope: Some offices investigate deaths more extensively 
than others—that is, their threshold for what deaths are 
deemed suspicious is lower. Possible measures of this are 
the yearly expenditures of the office and the fraction of 
possibly suspicious deaths for which autopsies are 
actually conducted.  
 
One could imagine even more intricate measures that would 
address specific concerns about having political actors running death 
 
 34. An alternate source of information here, which we are considering for future research, is 
ethics complaints against public officials. Most states have procedures that allow for complaints 
to be made against public officials, and there is often information about the substance of the 
complaints. See, e.g., Forrest Berkshire, Deputy Coroner Resigns After Ethics Complaint Filed, KY. 
STANDARD (May 1, 2014, 8:32 AM), http://www.kystandard.com/content/deputy-coroner-resigns-
after-ethics-complaint-filed [https://perma.cc/556H-K7RU] (detailing basis for ethics complaint 
against coroner). 
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examinations, such as the fraction of suspicious prison deaths that do 
not get investigated. One might also look at the fraction of initial 
autopsies where a second one—requested by family members or 
performed by an outside agency—concludes with a different result. We 
decided for the purpose of this Article to focus on the basic measures. 
Of the four measures, we made progress in obtaining 
information related to the first two proxies for death examination 
quality listed above: measures of whether the offices in the state had 
been certified by a credible national agency and numbers of litigation 
events. We were unable to generate measures related to the latter two 
proxies. Systematic measures of autopsy-related scandals, based on a 
search from a subset of national news outlets, turned out to be difficult. 
Many stories relating to autopsy scandals do not make it to the national 
news, and comparing news stories from local outlets that vary 
enormously in quality and coverage is difficult. Finally, the scope 
measure was one that we were initially hoping to use based on the 
methodology used in the NPR and ProPublica study (including in 
particular the difference between actual numbers of autopsies and 
expected numbers of autopsies). However, it turned out to be difficult to 
obtain data on either the numbers of autopsies or the budgets of 
individual offices. There are no reliable published sources, and our 
attempts at contacting individual offices for information were 
unsuccessful. For future research, we hope to set up a more extensive 
research team to start collecting the kind of ground level data that we 
were unable to obtain in our initial attempts. 
We obtained data on whether a state only has coroners (Coroner 
Only) or has either a mix of medical examiners and coroners or only 
medical examiners (Partial or Medical Examiner Only) from the work 
of Randy Hanzlick, the chief medical examiner of Fulton County 
(Georgia).35 We also obtained data on the number of medical examiner 
offices in a state that are accredited by the NAME, as measured in 2016. 
We compared states directly based on NAME. Because the population 
of a state may affect the NAME number, we also compared states based 
on the NAME per million people in the population in 2010. 
We obtained data on the number of autopsy-related litigation 
cases involving allegations of misconduct from January 1, 1950, to 
February 1, 2017, through searches on Westlaw and Lexis. Our search 
uncovered only those cases with opinions that appear in Westlaw or 
Lexis, so the search is likely underinclusive of all autopsy-related 
litigation. In addition, given that most of the public officials being sued 
 
 35. Hanzlick & Combs, supra note 7, at 871. 
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will have some kind of qualified immunity from suit,36 some of the 
claims may be getting dismissed early in the litigation process on 
immunity grounds and, as a result, may not appear in Westlaw or Lexis. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that the number of cases without 
opinions is not correlated with Coroner Only compared with Partial or 
Medical Examiner Only states, our comparison provides an accurate 
depiction of the relative performance of Coroner Only and Partial or 
Medical Examiner Only states. Because the amount of autopsy 
litigation is correlated with the number of deaths in a state (which in 
turn is correlated with state population), we scale the number of 
autopsy litigation cases by the population of each state measured in 
1950 (Autopsy litigation per million population in 1950). 
III. ANALYSIS 
As noted above, the ProPublica/NPR study collected data on a 
variable—the abnormal autopsy rate—that we thought would be a good 
preliminary indicator on the question we were interested in 
investigating. However, as mentioned above, the study did not collect 
data on enough of the Coroner Only states to provide meaningful 
evidence of the difference. Still, we report our analysis of their data to 
provide a sense of the direction in which their results point.  
Figure 1 reports a comparison of abnormal autopsy rates, 
defined as the difference between actual autopsy rates and expected 
rates, for Coroner Only states, states using a mix of the Coroner and 
Medical Examiner systems, and states using the Medical Examiner 
system only. The NPR website explains: 
The autopsy rate is calculated based on autopsies per 100,000 deaths. Then, using the 
CDC mortality data, ProPublica looked at the relationship between the autopsy rate and 
the rates of unintentional deaths and homicides. They found that the higher the homicide 
and unintentional-death rate in an area, the higher the autopsy rate tends to be. They 
used this relationship to compute an expected autopsy rate and then compared the 
expected autopsy rate and the actual autopsy rate to see whether counties and states 
performed fewer, more than or the expected number of autopsies, given their rates of 
unintentional deaths and homicides. 37 
The bar graphs in Figure 1 show that the gap between autopsy 
and expected autopsy rates for Medical Examiner Only states is 
different from states with Partial systems (termed “Mix” in the Figure) 
and from states with Coroner Only systems. And, while the differences 
 
 36. See, e.g., Waeschle v. Dragovic, 576 F.3d 539, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing a 
government official’s qualified immunity defense); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 68.50.015 (2017) 
(codifying qualified immunity defense for coroners and medical examiners). 
 37. Autopsy Data, supra note 26. 
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are not statistically significant, Figure 1 paints a distinct picture: other 
things equal, medical examiners perform more autopsies than coroners 
compared with the number of expected autopsies.  
 
FIGURE 1: ABNORMAL AUTOPSY RATE (NPR/PROPUBLICA 2007 DATA) 




Next, we move to the data we collected on accreditation and 
litigation. Table 1 reports on the comparison between Partial or Medical 
Examiner Only states and Coroner Only states. For purposes of our 
binary comparisons, we group Partial and Medical Examiner Only 
states to test whether states that have at least some use of medical 
examiners (and thus at some point experienced a decision to implement 
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Number of NAME Accredited 
Offices in 2016 
3.051 1.273  0.077 
     
Number of NAME Accredited 
Offices in 2016 per Million 
Population* 
0.543 0.305  0.111 
     
Autopsy Litigation from 1950 
to 2017 per Million 
Population** 
4.285 10.010  0.060 
*For the Number of NAME Accredited Offices in 2016 per Million Population 
measure, we used state population data from 2010.  
**For the Autopsy Litigation from 1950 to 2017 per Million Population measure, we 
used state population data from 1950. 
 
As we observed with the ProPublica autopsy data, under each of 
our measures for the quality of medical examinations, we find evidence 
that coroners perform poorly compared with professional medical 
examiners. Coroners are correlated with both fewer absolute numbers 
of accredited medical examiner offices as well as fewer accredited offices 
per million in population. The difference between Coroner Only and 
Partial or Medical Examiner Only states is significant at the 10% level 
for the absolute NAME measure. The difference for the NAME per 
million population measure is significant at the 11.1% level, just beyond 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Likewise, we find that 
Coroner Only states experience higher litigation rates involving 
autopsies compared with Partial or Medical Examiner Only states. This 
difference is significant at the 10% level. 
We next look to gain traction on the question of why a state 
might choose to stay with a coroner system. Specifically, we look to 
examine whether states that remain exclusively with the coroner 
system do so because of corruption or out of a preference for direct 
democracy, even at the expense of medical examination quality. As a 
measure of corruption, we utilize the ranking of states from the Center 
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for Public Integrity in 2015.38 The Center for Public Integrity gives each 
state a corruption grade based on its assessment of the state along a 
number of categories including political financing, electoral oversight, 
lobbying disclosure, executive accountability, legislative accountability, 
and judicial accountability, among other categories. We focus in 
particular on those states that earned an “F” grade in 2015, accounting 
for eleven of the fifty states. Table 2 reports on the comparison of 
Coroner Only and Partial or Medical Examiner Only states based on 
the incidence of “F” corruption grades. 
 
TABLE 2: STATE COMPARISON OF CORRUPTION SCORE 
  
 
Partial or Medical 









“F” Score in 
2015* 
0.150 0.500 0.016 
*State corruption score from the Center for Public Integrity 2015 state rankings. 
 
Note from Table 2 that half of the Coroner Only states received 
an “F” grade in 2015 while only 15% of the Partial or Medical Examiner 
Only states received an “F” grade. This difference is significant at the 
1.6% confidence level. Put differently, the states using the coroner 
system are among the most corrupt in terms of government officials. 
An alternative story for the use of coroner systems is that the 
populations for some states might have a strong preference for direct 
democracy. As a multivariate test of when a state shifted to either a 
partial or medical examiner only system, we estimated a series of Cox 
proportional hazard models for the first adoption of a professional 
medical examiner in a state, looking at state-year level data. The Cox 
proportional hazard model is a type of statistical survival model that 
relates the time until a specified event to various independent variables 
that may affect the amount of time until the event (such as the state 
population over time). For the independent variables in the Cox 
proportional hazards model, we include the log of the state population 
determined by the most recent census (so for 1964 we used the 1960 
state population), as well as indicator variables for the judicial selection 
regime for state supreme court judges as a proxy for the state’s 
 
 38. Yue Qiu et al., How Does Your State Rank for Integrity?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 
9, 2015, 12:04 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/09/18822/how-does-your-state-rank-
integrity [https://perma.cc/V2NZ-L2SZ]. 
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preference for direct democracy. We code the judicial selection systems 
in terms of four broad categories of systems that are frequently used in 
the literature comparing the different systems: Appointment, Merit 
Selection, Partisan Election, and Nonpartisan Election.39 We use 
Nonpartisan Election for state supreme court judges as the base 
category. Model 1 of Table 3 reports the results.40 
 
TABLE 3: HAZARD MODEL OF ADOPTION OF MEDICAL EXAMINER 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln (state  1.205 1.235 1.305 
population) (1.07) (1.11) (1.21) 
    
Partisan Election 2.079 — 2.064 
 (1.28) — (1.24) 
    
Merit Selection 3.354* — 3.375* 
 (2.24) — (2.01) 
    
Appointment 3.483* — 3.517+ 
 (2.25) — (1.82) 
    
Northeast — 1.758 1.277 
 — (1.07) (0.35) 
    
South — 2.087 1.350 
 — (1.57) (0.59) 
    
West — 1.284 1.657 
 — (0.44) (0.81) 
    
N 2760 2760 2760 
pseudo R2 0.040 0.023 0.043 
Log likelihood -121.4 -123.7 -121.0 
Exponentiated coefficients; z-statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05. 
 
In Model 1 of Table 3, note that the coefficients on Merit 
Selection and Appointment are both greater than one, indicating an 
increased probability of shifting to a professional medical examiner 
 
 39. These are explained in Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 9, at 297. 
 40. As a historical matter, the choices of state judicial election systems have been far more 
stable than the choices about whether to use a coroner system. See id. at 303–04 (discussing the 
stability of the judicial selection systems). As a practical matter, the judicial regimes were almost 
all put in place prior to the shift toward a professional medical examiner system (and therefore 
may be treated as roughly exogenous for our purposes). According to Hanzlick and Combs, the 
shift toward the medical examiner system was occurring on a fairly steady basis from the 1880s 
until roughly the 1980s, when it slowed down considerably. See Hanzlick & Combs, supra note 7, 
at 872–73. 
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compared with the base category of Nonpartisan Election states 
(significant at the 5% confidence level). This is consistent with a 
preference (as measured by the type of judicial selection system used) 
for direct democracy impacting how a state selects its coroners. 
Nonetheless, the differences between the coefficients for Partisan 
Election and Merit Selection and the coefficients for Partisan Election 
and Appointment are not significantly different from zero. 
To test whether there is a geographic region effect, we remove 
the judge selection indicator variables and replace them with regional 
indicators for whether a state is a member of U.S. Census Region 
Northeast, South, or West, with the Midwest as the base category. 
Model 2 of Table 3 reports the results. None of the coefficients on the 
regional indicators are significantly different from zero. Thus, region 
itself does not explain the shift to a professional medical examiner 
system.  
Lastly, Model 3 of Table 3 combines the indicator variables for 
the judge selection regime with the region indicator variables. As 
reported in Model 3, the indicator variables for the Merit Selection and 
Appointment regimes continue to be greater than one and significant, 
consistent with citizens from more election-focused states preferring to 
remain with the coroner system. However, as with Model 1, the 
differences between the coefficients for Partisan Election and Merit 
Selection and the coefficients for Partisan Election and Appointment 
are not significantly different from zero. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the limited availability of data, we can make a few 
observations about coroner systems versus medical examiner ones. 
Generally speaking, the death examiner offices in coroner states 
perform fewer autopsies than they should, are less likely to be 
accredited by the major national organization, and generate greater 
amounts of litigation. Of these three measures that we report on, the 
accreditation number is perhaps the most meaningful. In theory, death 
examination offices run by politicians could do well on these scores, but 
our findings suggest that they do not. An alternative possibility, 
though, is that the accreditation system is run by the professional 
medical examiners and biased against the offices in coroner states.  
The next question to ask is why states choose to remain with the 
coroner systems, despite the wide condemnation they have received. 
Two possibilities that we cannot dismiss are (a) that states with greater 
amounts of official corruption prefer elected officials doing death 
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examinations, and (b) that these are states that, as a general matter, 
prefer direct democracy. 
Our results do no more than begin to identify the differences 
between coroner and medical examiner systems in terms of quality. We 
hope to have shown, however, that it is worth investing in better data, 
so that scholars can begin to get some traction on answering these 
questions more thoroughly. 
There are two lines of attack that could be usefully pursued. 
First, there is the cross-sectional data comparing states (and better, 
counties) in terms of the relative performances of their departments, 
controlling for variables that might capture local differences. Second, 
given that a number of states (and counties) have changed their 
systems in recent years—North Carolina, for example41—scholars can 
now do case studies of the individual county systems and compare the 
before and after results of the change.  
 
 
 41. See Jon Evans, Senate Votes to Abolish Columbus County Coroner’s Office, WECT (Apr. 
19, 2017, 7:24 PM), http://www.wect.com/story/35193713/senate-votes-to-abolish-columbus-
county-coroners-office [https://perma.cc/9C8D-9SPF] (recording vote to abolish coroners’ offices in 
multiple counties). 
